The journalist David Brooks has a new podcast with The Atlantic called The Permanent Questions. In a recent episode (“Do Human Beings Have Souls?”), he invited the Yale University philosopher Shelly Kagan to explain why he doesn’t believe humans have souls. (Kagan may be best known for his YouTube lecture series from his course “Death”.) Overall, while Brooks was a gracious host, he was out of his league with Kagan. Brooks arguments for the existence of a soul came down to what felt like vibes; Kagan kept acknowledging the value of soul-language to explain certain elements of the human experience, but then would show that this doesn’t necessitate a non-material thing.
Personally, I think what people have called “Atman” or “Psyche” or “Soul” or whatever is best understood as what we tend to call “consciousness” now. To be fair, I don’t think we understand consciousness like we’d like to, so that leaves it with a mysterious aura akin to what “soul” means for many people. I have written a bit about this already (see “The Christian ‘soul,’ the Hindu ‘atman,’ and the Buddhist ‘consciousness'”). And I don’t think this is incompatible with Christian teaching, since, as Kagan himself notes, early Christians affirmed the resurrection of the body because they thought that we are bodied beings, not (merely?) embodied souls. I imagine that we’re something like code. The code I am now gives way to the coding that will create and sustain me in seven minutes, seven days, seven months, and seven years, respectively. The coding that I am now is based on the coding that I was seven minutes, seven days, seven months, and seven years ago, respectively. If resurrection is an event, I would concede that the resurrected “me” of the future is different from the me of the present, but also a continuation because of a “sense” of identity, memories, network of relations, sense of body in space and time, etc. This is not a problem because I think this is the same basic relationship between 2026 me and 2016 or 2006 or 1996 or 1986 me.
The “From Nowhere to Nothing” podcast had an episode on “The Soul” recently. Joel Bouchard mentioned a thought experiment based on John Locke’s “The Prince and the Cobbler”. He said something like this: Imagine you’re a poor cobbler. You’re told that your soul could switch to the body of a prince, but you wouldn’t bring any of your own memories, emotions, etc.; you’d inherit his completely. Would you do it? Personally, I see no reason to say “yes”. If my “soul” is separate from memories, emotions, etc., then there’s nothing I can imagine that actually changes. If the soul is memories, emotions, etc., then the change matters; if it’s just some life force underlying those things, then it doesn’t matter. This is one reason why I find reincarnation mostly uncompelling. For many who believe in reincarnation, you don’t remember your past identities. You’re shaped by them (karma), but you don’t identify with them. This seems useful for justifying why one person has a good life and another has a difficult one; it seems useful for supporting the status quo. It doesn’t seem practical otherwise. Buddhism has a similar problem when it’s taught that rebirth from a previous physical form is not remembered; its strength lies when in a single life it presents the past us as making way for the present us, who is making way for the future us, because we can see the causality and we can identify with the past and future “I,” much like we identify with family and friends that we love. Insofar as “resurrection” maintains this sense of identity continuation, it seems more relevant (though this isn’t the same as saying it is “true”).

